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RESPONSES TO THE GROWTH OF
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WEST GERMANY: A COMPARISON
OF CHANGES IN CRIMINAL LAW
AND SOCIETAL ATTITUDES
GuntherArztt

The United States is in many respects much more advanced than other
societies. Yet not all of these advancements in American society are meritorious. The crime rate in the United States is higher and has risen faster
than in many other countries. This Article will compare the American response to the growth of crime-particularly adaptations in the criminal law
and in societal attitudes toward crime control policy-to that of West Germany. My aim is to consider the consequences of the growth of crime in
the two countries, not merely the differences in substantive' or procedural 2
3
criminal law, or in crime statistics.

A long-term increase in the crime rate in a society will presumably
t Professor of Law, University of Erlangen-Ntirnberg; Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell
Law School (Spring 1978). Dr.jur. 1962, University of Tuebingen; LL.M. 1965, University of
California-Berkeley.
I. Most comparisons of German and American substantive criminal law concentrate on
specific topics such as abortion, attempt, and the like. For more comprehensive comparative
discussions, see H. SILVING, CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF CRIME (1967); 0. LEE & T. ROBERTSON, "MORAL ORDER" AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFORM EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WEST GERMANY (1973).

2. See Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France,Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); Langbein & Weinreb, Continental CriminalProcedur" "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978); Goldstein & Marcus,
Comment on ContinentalCriminalProcedure,87 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978); Schlesinger, Comparative CriminalProcedure:A Pleafor Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 361
(1977).

See also J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977).

3. Several attempts have been made to compare crime rates, mostly with the aim of uncovering the causes of crime or examining whether and why foreign crime prevention systems
are more successful. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1968); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY
TO REDUCE CRIME 139, 141 (1973) imits comparisons to the issue of gun control). See
generally L. RADZINOWICZ & J. KING, THE GROWTH OF CRIME (1977).
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produce many subtle changes, including legal changes, in that society.
These changes do not usually appear to be dramatic if viewed from a shortterm perspective. In fact, changes both in the criminal law and in societal
attitudes may occur so slowly that they are not even perceived, let alone
questioned, although their cumulative effect may be profound.
West Germany presently has a considerably lower level of crime than
the United States, but its rate of crime is growing persistently. The American experience in adjusting to a high crime rate may be a portent of the
German future; and the American present may represent a dramatic acceleration of the current slow changes now taking place in Germany. A comparison of the methods by which each country is adapting to increases in
crime may further a recognition and understanding of the incremental
changes Germany is currently undergoing. In addition, such a comparison
may enable us to consider whether alternative legal responses and policies
would be more desirable and practical.
II
COMPARISON OF CRIME RATES
The crime rate in America is considerably higher than the rate in Germany. In 1976 there were roughly 300% more rapes, 300% more burglaries,
and 700% more robberies reported to the police in the United States per
100,000 inhabitants than were reported in Germany. 4 Similar differences
between American and West German crime rates exist with respect to other
crimes. The first German victimization study, which was made of the city
of Stuttgart, confirms that the risk of victimization is considerably lower in
Stuttgart than in U.S. cities of comparable size. 5
The rate at which particular crimes are increasing also varies between
the two countries. Whereas burglaries are increasing at approximately the
same rate in Germany and the United States, the gap between the robbery
rate in the two countries is growing because the German rate is increasing
more slowly than the American rate. The incidence of rape, which is perhaps a special case, has not increased significantly in Germany since 1963.
In that year the German rate was higher than the American rate. Since
6
then, the U.S. figure has tripled.
4. The German figures for 1976 were 11.3 rapes and 31.6 robberies per 100,000 inhabitants. BUNDESKRIMINALAMT, POLIZEILICHE KR1MINALSTATISTIK 10 (1976). The U.S. figures
for 1976 were 26.4 rapes and 195.8 robberies per 100,000 inhabitants. FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, [1976] UNIFoRM CRIME REPORTS 15, 18. Seealso G. ARZT, DER RUF NACH
RECHT UND ORDNUNG 30-32 (1976) (detailed comparison of the period from 1963-73).
5. E. STEPHAN, DIE STUTrGARTER OPFERBEFRAOUNG 327-34 (1976) (summary in English at 353-66).
6. G. ARZT, supra note 4, at 30.
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A caveat is in order at this point: although comparisons of American
and German crime statistics demonstrate in a general way the higher crime
rate in America, they may not present a completely accurate picture for
several reasons. A meaningful comparison requires that adjustments be
made for differences in the reporting of criminal acts to authorities, as well
as in the definitions of the crimes reported. Purse-snatching, for example,
is not considered a robbery by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. In Germany, more than 15% of all reported robberies are incidents of pursesnatching.7 German and American crime statistics also differ with respect
to age groups and population concentrations.
Furthermore, although substantive law definitions of crimes can be adjusted to facilitate comparisons, the statistics so obtained still exclude confrontations that fall short of conduct satisfying the substantive definition of
an attempted or consummated crime. Even though such confrontations do
not constitute a crime for crime statistics purposes, they contribute in a very
real sense to the risk and fear of being victimized. 8 Since crime statistics
include only confrontations that actually develop into attempted or consummated crimes, they drastically understate the total victimization risk.
There is no basis for arbitrarily assuming that the proportion of confrontations where the commission of a crime never occurred to confrontations
where a crime was actually attempted or consummated is the same in all
countries. In the absence of studies that reflect the total victimization risk
and therefore the extent of societal fears of victimization, it is difficult to
make a truly meaningful comparison of crime rates for the purpose of examining how different societies respond to an increasing crime rate.
II
RESPONSES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
TO THE OVERLOAD CREATED BY INCREASING CRIME
A decade ago, when public concern over the crime issue first began to
rise, the United States exhibited a tremendous reluctance to acknowledge
that its high and rising crime rate might not abate in the foreseeable future.9
7. Compare [1976] UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supranote 4, at 18,26 (purse-snatching is
included in the definition of larceny but not in the definition of robbery) with POLizELriCHE
KRImINALsTATISTrK, supra note 4, at 21 (18% of all German robberies reported in 1976 were
incidents of purse-snatching).
8. See Arzt, Ursachen und Folgen der Kriminalitiitsfurcht, 100 JURISSCHE B ArrER

(Aus.) 173, 175-76 (1978).
9. President Johnson declared war on crime in 1965, establishing the President's Com-

mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Exec. Order No. 11,236,30 Fed.
Reg. 9349 (1965).

In announcing the appointment of the commission, the President stated:

We must arrestand reverse the
"All these [programs] are vital, but they are not enough ....
trend toward lawlessness." President's Message to Congress on Law Enforcement and the
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In the late 1960's, many prophecies of doom circulated based on the assumption that a democratic society could not adapt to such a high crime
rate.10 In Germany today, there is a similar reluctance to accept the possibility that Germany could experience an increase in the crime rate so dramatic as to approach the current American level. But just as the United
States is adjusting to rising crime, so will Germany have to adjust if its
crime rate continues to rise. Germany, however, might face some special
problems in adapting to higher crime rates because of the nature of its criminal law system. These potential problems are worth exploring.
A.

TH

GERMAN LEGALITY PRINCIPLE

It should be obvious that increases in crime lead to pressures within a
criminal justice system. The American discretionary prosecution principle
helps to reduce such pressures because it regulates input into the criminal
justice system at the procedural level. The German system, however, differs from the American in a very important respect: the German Legalitdtsprinzip, or legality principle," calls for compulsory prosecution of all
Administration ofJustice, [1965] 1 PUB. PAPERS 263, 264 (emphasis in original). See generally
Finckenauer, Crime as a NationalPoliticalIssue:1964-76, 24 CRWM & DELINQUENCY 13, 1622 (1978).
10. See, ag., J. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 346 (1969) (Report of the Task
Force on Violent Aspects of Protest and Confrontation, National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence). The Skolnick Report concludes with the following warning:
This nation cannot have it both ways: either it will carry through a firm commitment
to massive and widespread political and social reform, or it will develop into a society
of garrison cities where order is enforced without due process of law and without the
consent of the governed.
For another prediction of the demise of society, see R. ARDREY, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

(1970).
The rise in crime also touched off heated political dialogue.

Many political candidates

made campaign issues out of high crime, promising to reduce it if elected. See Finckenauer,
.supranote 9, at 16-19.
11. STRAPROZ F3ORWNUNG [STPO] (Code of Criminal Procedure) §§ 152, 163 (W. Ger.).
STPO § 152, as translated in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 158, provides:
I. The public prosecutor is responsible for preferring the official charge.
II. Except as otherwise provided by law he is required to take action against all
prosecutable offenses, to the extent that there is a sufficient factual basis.
STPO § 163, as translated in 10 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE GERMAN
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 93 (H. Niebler trans. 1965), provides in part:
L Police agencies and officials shall investigate punishable acts and shall take all
measures which permit of no delay in order to prevent the matter from being obscured.
II. Police agencies and officials [shall] transmit to the prosecution without delay all
evidence collected by them.
The German legality principle has come under much discussion recently. See Jescheck, The
DiscretionaryPowers of the ProsecutingAttorney in West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508
(1970); Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. RPv. 439
(1974); Schram, The Obligationto Prosecutein West Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 627 (1969);
note 2 supra. For discussions of the extent to which the legality principle is adhered to in
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serious crimes. Under the legality principle, the substantive definitions of
serious crimes, not prosecutorial discretion, determine input into the criminal justice system. Any increase in serious crime creates a corresponding
increase in input into the system. Since the resources of the system, such as
prosecutors, judges, and prison personnel, tend to remain constant or increase much more slowly than does the crime rate, mandatory prosecution
in a period of rising crime tends to overload the system to the point of
collapse.
Some writers have claimed that, under a system of compulsory prosecution, only in theory do the substantive definitions of crimes determine
input into the system. In practice, informal procedures arise under which
selective prosecution occurs.' 2 Although the manpower of the criminal
court system is flexible enough to cope with an overload of up to ten or
twenty percent, the final stage of criminal procedure-prison sentencing-is
very inflexible. Prison capacity cannot be exceeded, at least not without
violating prisoners' rights to a minimum of living space and humane treatment. 13 Therefore, according to the argument, a compulsory prosecution
system must in practice allow some prosecutorial discretion in order to ad14
just to the bottleneck created by the capacity of its prisons.
Although a plausible hypothesis, the above argument does not reflect
reality. In fact, Germany has increased the use of fines and suspended
sentences while drastically reducing actual imprisonment.15 This trend
away from imprisonment is attributable less to adjustments to the increase
in crime than to an unrelated trend toward employing a rehabilitative approach to punishment.16 The decrease in punishment by imprisonment
actual practice, see Darby, Discussion of Petty Offenses, 24 AM. J. COMp. L. 768, 778 (1976);
Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 2; Herrmann, The Role of Compulsory Prosecutionand the
Scope ofProsecutorialDiscretionin Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. Rv. 468 (1974).
12. See, eg., Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 2; Darby, supra note 11, at 778 n.43. Gold-

stein and Marcus state:
The principle of compulsory prosecution, which formally permeates the German and
Italian systems, and informally the French, demands the impossible: full enforcement
of the law in a time of rising crime and fierce competition for resources. Inevitably,
adjustments must be made in the way in which the principle is to be applied; where
formal law or ideology does not permit these adjustments, informal processes are created that do.

Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 2, at 280.
13. There is a constitutional guarantee of rehabilitative treatment in Germany. See Judg-

ment of June 5, 1973 ("Lebach"), 35 BVerfGE 202, 235-38.
14. Goldstein and Marcus suggest that the Italian practice of periodically granting amnesty may be attributable to an overload of its criminal justice system. Goldstein & Marcus,
supra note 2, at 282 n.95.
15. Although the total number of crimes known to the police in Germany jumped from
1,678,840 in 1963 to 3,063,271 in 1976 and the total number of sentences during this period

rose from 309,268 to 388,767, the total prison population declined from 43,453 to 35,085. See
G. ARzT, supra note 4, at 154.

16. This reduction in the prison population is traceable to two distinct views toward reha-

48

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUNAL

[Vol. 12:43

should come as no surprise to American observers, since the growth of

been accompanied by a corresponding
crime in the United States has not
17
increase in the prison population.
Prison capacity is thus not a bottleneck that will cause a breakdown of
the German principle of compulsory prosecution. Growing crime nevertheless puts a heavy strain on the resources earmarked for rehabilitative
purposes I8 and leaves unresolved the basic problem--overloading of the
criminal justice system as a whole.
B. DECRIMINALIZATION
Seemingly the most logical method of reducing the burden placed on a
compulsory prosecution system by the growth of crime would be to
decriminalize less serious offenses, or "marginal crime." Law enforcement
officials in a compulsory prosecution system often favor decriminalization
because they see it as the only method of reducing their workload. The
alternative-far-reaching criminal laws but selective enforcement-is not
available under the German system.
bilitation-one optimistic, the other pessimistic. The optimistic view is that rehabilitation
protects society against potential future criminal acts. For an official statement of the goals of
rehabilitation, see STRAFVOLLZUoSGESETZ [STVG] (Federal Code of Imposition of Punishment) § 2 (W. Ger.). See also 21 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODEs, ALTERNAm DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY §§ 2, 37, 38 (J.
Darby trans. 1977); Baumann, The Alternative DraftPreparedby the Criminal-Law Teachers to
the Code of CriminalLaw and Execution of Punishment, 1 LAW & STATE 52 (1970); Eser,
CriminalLawReforrn Germany, 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 245, 252-57 (1973). Under the optimistic
view, rehabilitation is possible only if prisons are uncrowded, prison personnel is well trained,
and prisoners are institutionalized for a significant amount of time. Therefore, criminals who
have committed only minor to medium offenses, and perhaps even criminals who have committed very serious offenses but who are not in need of rehabilitation, should be diverted from
the prison system. Sanctions for these offenders should include fines, suspended sentences, or
obligations of restitution. As a result, prisons are available for those who are in need of rehabilitation.
The pessimistic view is that imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes is a dismal failure.
Pessimists see imprisonment not as a cure for crime but as a cause or "factory" of future crime.
See R. CLARY, CRIME IN AMERICA 212-38 (1970); Walker, Reexamining the PresidentrCrime
Commisiion, 24 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 8 (1978) ("Today, the commission's optimism is
regarded by those in criminal justice as almost a bad joke."). They therefore encourage diverting as many offenders as possible from the prison system. For those offenders who cannot
be diverted, the pessimists would urge institutionalization to protect society against their criminal activities. Paradoxically, the result under the pessimistic view is the same as that under
the optimistic view: the prison population declines, at least in relation to the arrest rate.
17. Even though the U.S. attitude toward imprisonment is similar to that of Germany-a
curious blend of rehabilitative optimism and pessimism-there is a basic difference. The
United States has two alternative methods by which to divert offenders from the prison system:
by meting out milder sanctions after conviction at trial or by procedural devices such as selective prosecution and plea bargaining. Under the legality principle, however, only the former
method is available in Germany.
18. See R. CLARK, supra note 16, at 212-38.
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But there are problems with decriminalization in Germany. First, the
increase in Germany's crime rate has not been limited to an increase in
marginal crime. Decriminalization of marginal crimes would do nothing
to ease the burdens created by the upsurge in serious crime. Second, Germany has already decriminalized so many marginally criminal offenses that
any further decriminalization would have to be done not in the name of
liberalization but out of desperation. I do not want to imply that the possibilities for decriminalization are completely exhausted in Germany. I
have repeatedly urged the decriminalization of such minor property offenses as shoplifting.1 9 The effect of further decriminalization, however,
would be very limited, unless decriminalization were extended to hard core
crimes.
C.

BREAKDowN OF COMPULSORY PROSECUTION

A more realistic alternative for reducing the overload in the German
criminal justice system is the abandonment of the principle of compulsory
prosecution. The breakdown of this principle is clearly not far away.20
The advent of discretionary prosecution, although it would provide superior repressive capacity,2 1 would also impair the liberty and due process
19. The Fifty-first Congress of German Jurists, held in Stuttgart in 1976, discussed proposals to decriminalize petty offenses. See Naucke, Sanktionen jfir Kleinkrminalitidt
(StrafrechtlichesTeilgutachten), 51 VERHANDLUNGEN DES EINUNDFONFZIGSTEN DEUTSCHEN
JURISTENTAGES [DJT] at D1 (voL 1 1976); Deutsch, Sanktionen fir Kleinkriminalitiit
(ZipilrechthichesTeflgutachlen), 51 DJT at El (voL 1 1976); Stoll, 51 DJT at N7 (vol. 2 1976)
(Zivilrechtliches Referat); Arzt, 51 DJT at N43 (vol. 2 1976) (Strafrechtliches Referat). The
Congress ultimately rejected the proposals. 51 DJT at N178-81 (vol. 2 1976).
Other commentators have also considered the decriminalization issue. See, e.g., Vogler,
M"glichkeiten und Wege einer Enikriminalsierung, 90 ZE1TSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ZSTW] 132 (1978); Darby, supra note 11.
20. De facto deviations from the principle of compulsory prosecution are already becoming a problem. See authorities cited in note 11 supra. Efforts to expand de jure exceptions to
compulsory prosecution have had success both for minor and serious crimes. Recent "reform" legislation has given the prosecutor the power to bargain with those accused of minor
property crimes. Law of Jan. 1, 1975, [1974] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 469 (W.
Ger.)(codified at STPO § 153). Under STPO § 153, the prosecutor can decline to prosecute the
accused if the accused agrees to meet the prosecutor's demands. The statute, however, narrowly prescribes the demands the prosecutor may make. Such demands range from restitution to payments in the nature of a fine. See Herrmann, supra note 11, at 483; Jescheck, supra
note 11, at 513-14. Although information is as yet incomplete, it appears that prosecutors are
using their new authority sparingly. For a first empirical analysis, see W. AHRENS, DIE EINSTELLUNG IN DER HAUFPVERHANDLUNG GEM. §§ 153 II, 153 a II STPO, at 76-78 (1978).
As for serious crimes, Germany is in the midst of a heated controversy over whether to
introduce the concept of witness immunity into German law. See H. JUNG, STRAFFREIHET
FOR DEN KRONZEUGEN? (1974). Proposed legislation on witness immunity would allow the
government to promise immunity to cooperative witnesses in terrorist cases. Although the
legislation has been voted down several times, the margins are getting narrower. See Meyer,
Brauchen wir den Kronzeugen 9 ZErrScHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLrrIK [ZRP] 25, 25-27 (1976).
21. See note 29 infra.
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rights of suspected criminals.
1

Compulsory ProsecutionPrevents Overcriminalization

Under a compulsory prosecution system, the substantive criminal law
makes criminal only those acts that will always be subject to punishment.
Compulsory prosecution thereby prevents overcriminalization, 22 which
arises under discretionary prosecution. Overcriminalization involves making certain relatively minor offenses criminal and then selectively enforcing
them by prosecuting only the most egregious violators. Thus, as a general
rule violations of these offenses do not subject the offender to criminal sanctions; but there is no guarantee that any individual offender will not be
prosecuted.
2

DiscretionaryProsecutionis Subject to Inadequate Checks on
Administrative Power

Administrative discretion is a common characteristic of German
law-from the revocation of a driver's license or the issuance of a license
under a building ordinance to the distribution of welfare benefits. But exercises of administrative discretion are subject to clear limitations and court
supervision. Any alleged abuse of discretion within the administrative hierarchy is subject to judicial scrutiny. German university students can
even obtain judicial review of their instructors' discretion in grading examination papers.
Wherever the principle of discretionary prosecution has made inroads
in Germany, however, efforts to limit the discretion of the prosecutor have
been unsuccessful in all but the most outrageous cases of abuse. Similar
efforts have been equally unavailing in the United States. Several hundred
thousand discretionary prosecution decisions are made there every year.
Applying realistic standards to the wisdom and motives of the typical prosecutor, at least several hundred of these discretionary decisions are unfair
either to the alleged perpetrator or to the crime victim. 23 Yet few checks
and balances have been successfully developed in the American system to
curb these inevitable abuses of discretion in deciding whether to prosecute.24
22. "Overcriminalization" refers to criminal laws that enforce society's moral values (e...,
prostitution, abortion, gambling) or that criminalize activity as means of providing a social
service (eg., bad check laws, family support laws). Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,
374 AN ALS 157, 157 (1967).

23. Decisions might be unfair for a variety of reasons, among them inconsistency with
decisions made in similar cases and improper motivation.
24. There have been numerous attempts to bring about more consistency. See, e.g., J.
JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHnAowo DECISION: A POLICY PERSPECTIE (1977) (discussion

of evaluation procedures). The absence of adequate checks on exercises of discretion extends

1979]

RESPONSES TO INCREASING CRIME

3. DiscretionaryProsecutionDistortsProceduralSafeguards
When coupled with plea bargaining, discretionary prosecution denies
the accused the procedural safeguards that would accompany a full trial.
Discretionary prosecution allows the prosecutor to agree to reduce the
charge against an accused to a less serious offense in return for a guilty plea.
Consequently, where a risk of conviction after full trial exists, the prosecutor can coerce the accused to waive his right to a full trial and to a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Middle Ages, the sanction ofpoena ordinariaapplied to offenses
that could be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thepoena ordinariawas
supplemented by a lesser sanction, the poena extraordinaria. If the community strongly suspected that the accused had committed a crime but had
insufficient evidence to satisfy the standard of the poena ordinaria,the accused was charged under thepoena extraordinaria. Discretionary prosecution coupled with plea bargaining perpetuates the ancient doctrine of the
poena extraordinaria,
even though basic constitutional protections are
25
thereby sacrificed.
4. DiscretionaryProsecutionDistorts SubstantiveLaw Sanctions
Another effect of discretionary prosecution operating together with
plea bargaining is that an accused, by pleading guilty to a less serious offense than he allegedly committed, can obtain a milder sanction than that
which the substantive law specifies for the offense actually committed. Of
course, the willingness of the accused to plea bargain is dependent upon the
risk of conviction at full trial. Most defendants prefer the certainty of a
reduced sanction to the possibility of an acquittal coupled with a high
probability of a harsh sanction. The normal substantive law sanction for
an offense thus becomes the exception, thereby penalizing those who insist
on their constitutional right to a full trial and are subsequently convicted.
I should point out that in the United States the Supreme Court has
endeavored to erect some constitutional protections for criminal defendants
engaged in plea bargaining. 26 Also, some benefits may accrue to defendin the United States to police decisions on whether to investigate criminal activities in order to
prevent crime. But G( Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968)(victim sued city for failure to provide police protection after she complained that her boyfriend had threatened her with bodily harm).
25. J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 47-63 (1977). Langbein emphasizes

the correlation between sanctions, evidentiary standards, and methods of obtaining evidence.
As to such correlations in present German law, see G. ARzT, DELIKTE OEGEN DIE PERSON, in
STRAFREcTrr BESONDERER Tnm 1, 9-10 (1977).
26. Plea bargaining appeared to be out of favor after United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968), McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969). Now it appears that the subsequent cases of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
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ants who plea bargain. 27 I will not attempt to evaluate the merits of these

points. My thesis is simply that discretionary prosecution coupled with
plea bargaining creates a double standard of substantive criminal law sanctions. Defendants willing to plea bargain are less likely to face sanctions as
harsh as those meted out to defendants who are unwilling to plea bargain.
5. DiscretionaryProsecution Undermines the Purpose of the Substantive
Law
Discretionary prosecution allows the state to prosecute violators not for
the sake of enforcing the law violated, but in order to inflict punishment for

other; more serious violations for which insufficient proof exists to convict.
A familiar example of this type of distortion of the criminal law is the conviction of Al Capone for income tax evasion because of insufficient evidence to establish murder.28
This brief review of several of the weaknesses of discretionary prosecution is not necessarily an attack on the American system. Rather, it is a
reminder that, despite the drawbacks of discretionary prosecution, the
growth of crime in Germany will inevitably lead to the use of discretionary
prosecution because of its superior repressive capacity. This superiority
results from the fact that, given equal resources, a discretionary prosecution
system enforces a broader substantive law and thus represses29a broader
scope of behavior than does a compulsory prosecution system.
(1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.

790 (1970), have rescued plea bargaining. But the doubts whether the plea bargaining system
is good or even tolerable, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 751-53; id. at 775 (Brennan,
J., dissenting), have vanished with remarkable rapidity, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971). In Santobello, plea bargaining was deemed "an essential component of the administration of justice." Id. at 260. More recently, the Court refused to strike down a life
sentence obtained by a prosecutor in a forgery case against a defendant after the defendant
refused to bargain. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978).
27. Most defendants who plea bargain get the benefit of a milder sentence. Perhaps, however, the more than 90% of all criminal defendants who plea bargain end up receiving just and
fair sentences while the few who do not plea bargain (and are later convicted) receive unduly
harsh sentences. If this is the case, then plea bargaining does not confer a benefit. Instead, it
forces defendants to sacrifice their constitutional rights to avoid receiving an unduly harsh
sentence. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978)(convicted forger received life sentence after he refused to plea bargain).
28. See R. HAMMER, ORGANf.ED CRIME 149-50 (1975). See also note 62 infra and accompanying text.
29. Repressive capacity as used in this Article means the capacity to enforce substantive
law provisions by threat of criminal law sanctions, or deterrence potential. Still assuming
equal resources, there is no difference between the discretionary and compulsory prosecution
models in their actual repression in terms of convictions obtained, sanctions meted out, and
persons imprisoned. The greater repressive capacity of discretionary prosecution is demonstrated by the effect of decriminalization under each system. Under compulsory prosecution,
decriminalization means a reduction in the scope of behavior that the government must repress
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Nonetheless, I favor retention of a compulsory prosecution system.
The superiority of this system in ensuring the protection of individual liberty and due process far outweighs any shortcomings in terms of weaker
repressive capacity.
III
EXPANSION OF POLICE POWERS TO FIGHT RISING CRIME
Another potential consequence of an increasing crime rate is a disruption of the balance between individual rights and police power to combat
crime. In virtually all of its decisions concerning criminal procedure, the
United States Supreme Court has considered the likely effect of the decision
on police efficiency. In Terry v. Ohio,30 the Court considered the argument
that "the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible responses." 3 1 In
Miranda v. Arizona,32 the Court noted that "while protecting individual
rights, [we have] always given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies
in the legitimate exercise of their duties. '33 Public sentiment differs as to
whether the Court is molding the optimum balance between citizens' rights
and the powers of the police. 34 Viewed from a distance and with the benefit of hindsight, the Warren Court seems to have achieved an unlikely result: it strengthened the rights of the criminal defendant during a period of
rising crime and growing public concern over crime control. 35 The Burger
Court, however, seems to have started a reversal of this trend.
In Germany, members of Parliament are most directly susceptible to
public pressure to reduce crime, to get tough with criminals, and to
strengthen police power. Expansion of the powers of the German police to
by criminal sanctions and a reduction in the output in the form of convictions, sanctions, and
imprisonment. Under discretionary prosecution, decriminalization results in a reduction in
the scope of behavior subject to repression by criminal sanctions. It does not, however, affect
the output in the form of convictions, sanctions, and imprisonment, because the repressive
capacity no longer needed for crimes that have been decriminalized can be used to repress
more vigorously other behavior that previously had been de facto tolerated as a result of limited resources within the criminal justice system.
30. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. Id. at 10.
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. Id. at 481. A dissent in Mirandaattacked the decision of the Court as undermining
crime prevention and police performance. Id. at 537-42 (White, J., dissenting).
34. This balance is generally characterized as between individual liberty and public security. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this characterization as misleading. See,
eg., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 599 (1971) ("the Fourth Amendment ... surely
was never intended as a hindrance to fair, vigorous law enforcement.").
35. The Court, of course, had many critics, especially from the law enforcement personnel
whose actions were so frequently under scrutiny. This led Mr. Justice Fortas to complain of
"foot-dragging" by the police. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 276 (1969) (dissenting

opinion).
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fight crime is therefore more likely to occur by code amendment than by
3
case law.

6

Electronic surveillance 37 and centralization of the police are two important issues over which public pressure is mounting in Germany. The
pressure for increased use of electronic surveillance has been spurred at
least in part by American experiences. 38 The Schleyer kidnapping 39 in autumn 1977 has heightened interest in both issues, especially police centralization. Police investigations in Germany are presently within the control
of the prosecutor, and the police are at his command. But the police are
becoming resentful of the prosecutor's right to control investigations. 40 As
36. In the past few years, Germany has enacted several amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in response to terrorism. Law of Dec. 9, 1974, [1974] BGBl 13393; Law of Dec.
20, 1974, [1974] BGB1 I 3686; Law of Aug. 18, 1976, [1976] BGB1 I 2181; Law of Sept. 30,
1977, [1977] BGBI 1877; Law of Apr. 14, 1978, [1978] BGB1 497.
37. Presently there is no authority in Germany for interception of oral communications.
STPO § 100 allows wire interception only. In 1977, in order to intercept verbal messages of
Dr. Traube, a nuclear scientist suspected of involvement with terrorists, the police had to rely
on STRAFGSETZBUCH [STGB] (Penal Code) § 34 (W. Ger.). This section deals with those
rare situations where two legally protected interests conflict. The citizen may resolve this conffict by violating the lesser interest, relying on the broadly defined grant ofauthority in STGB §
34. The Traube case first drew attention to the now highly controversial issue of whether the
government may invoke STGB § 34 in general and specifically in wiretapping cases. See
Amelung, ErweiternallgemeineRechtfertigungsgriunde,insbesondere § 34 StGB, hoheitlicheEmgrffsbfugnisse des Staate., 30 NEUE JURISTIsCHE WOCl-NSCHRIFT [NJW] 833 (1977).
38. The U.S. Congress enacted wiretapping authority in 1968, Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-802, 82 Stat. 197 (1968)(codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1976)), despite skepticism on the part of the administration. See J. CARR, THE
LAw OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 21-33 (1977). President Johnson later called the legislation a "major disappointment" and "a grave danger to our constitutional rights." L. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE PorT 335 (1971).
39. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, at I, col 2.
40. Police investigative power is a complex issue. The STPO establishes the legal duties
and authority of both police and prosecutors. See notes 2 & I Irupra. The STPO regulates
criminal detection, investigations, apprehension, and prosecution, placing prosecutors in
charge of these procedures. The police are placed at the disposal of the prosecutors and are
under their command.
Nevertheless, in practice the police operate independently of the prosecutors until they believe the case is solved. They then submit the file to the prosecutor. The prosecutor normally
exerts his influence only in very serious cases, or in cases in which the police want to employ
investigative techniques requiring judicial approval-for which only the prosecutor can apply.
When prosecutors do get involved in investigations, the police resent such participation as
"meddling" because the police normally have the better resources to deal with crime. Although the conflict has rarely surfaced publicly, a few years ago a public controversy developed between the Munich Police Chief, Manfred Schreiber, and a leading Munich prosecutor,
Erich Sechser, over the handling of the Luhmer kidnapping case. See Schreiber,
Kindesenfahrungen,25 KiMINALIsTIK 225 (1971) (attacking the "legal fiction" that the prosecutor "dominates" police investigations); Sechser, Staatsanwaltchafi und Polizet; 25
KRM&NALIsTIK 349 (1971) (bitter reply to Schreiber).
Schreiber and Sechser later disagreed over the handling of the Rammelmayr case. The
police wanted to allow Rammelmayr, who had taken hostages in an attempted bank robbery
in downtown Munich, to leave the bank with his hostages. The police would have waited to
attempt a rescue operation. The prosecutor wanted Rammelmayr arrested on the spot.
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German police budgets increase, the police may become even more hostile
to a system that gives prosecutors the legal right to take charge of police
investigations.
41
Should police disregard of defendants' rights become a problem,
Germany may have to reconsider whether the heretofore relaxed approach
to formal requirements taken by the federal Code of Criminal Procedure
and state police statutes is appropriate. Perhaps Germany will have to control the power to search, seize, and arrest as the United States currently
does. On the surface, the search and seizure laws of the two countries are
already quite similar.42 The major difference is the particularity requirement of U.S. law. STPO section 103 requires particularity, but only for
searches of persons or homes of nonsuspects. For suspects, the law does
not demand particularity with respect to the objects acquired by search or
the places to be searched.43 Finally, searches and seizures in violation of
the law do not lead to the exclusion of evidence so obtained. 44
The probability of Germany abandoning these rules to adopt an approach more similar to that of the United States is not very high. After all,
even in the United States there is considerable disenchantment with, for
example, the exclusionary rule.45 Furthermore, the necessity for adopting
Sechser ordered a shootout which resulted in the death of a hostage. For a detailed account of

the Rammelmayr case and of the controversy between Schreiber and Sechser, see DER SPIEGEL, Aug. 9, 1971, at 25, 25-28.
41. There is no clear indication of why police lawlessness has not become a pressing problem in Germany. I suggest that the following three factors contribute at least in part to keeping police corruption low: (1) the police force is organized on a statewide level and the
promotion incentive makes internal controls very effective; (2) since there is less incidence of
violent crime, especially against the policemen, the police can deal with suspects in a more
detached manner, and (3) gambling and prostitution, major sources of police corruption in
the United States, are almost completely decriminalized.
42. Warrantless searches in both countries are permissible only if there is danger in delay.
STPO § 105; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1969). Moreover the German substantive requirement of suspicion or Verdacht, STPO § 102, is roughly equivalent to the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment. T. KLEINKNECHT, KOMMENTAR ZUR
STRAFPROZE3oRDNurNG § 102 (W. Ger.), annot. No. 6 (30th ed. 197 1)(suspicion must be based
on facts, past criminal experience, or rational deductions, not merely surmise or hunch). But
see note 43 infra.
43. STPO § 102. The less stringent German particularity requirement may have the practical effect of lessening the degree of suspicion necessary to obtain a search warrant to a level
below that required in the United States.
44. Very few German cases have arisen involving illegal searches or seizures. The German Constitutional Court has, however, considered searches of press archives. Judgment of
Aug. 5, 1966 ("Spiegel"), 20 BVerfGE 162. The court demanded a balancing of the two interests involved: freedom of the press and effective administration of justice. As to whether the
search of the Spiegel archives was justified, the court split evenly and consequently upheld the
search warrant. This decision led to an amendment to the STPO limiting these searches and
conferring special witness immunity on members of the news media. STPO §§ 53 (1)(5), 97
(1)(5), 98 ().
45. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411-27 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See also Finckenauer, supra note 9, at 35-37 (discussion of
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the American approach has not yet arisen in Germany; there is little evidence of increased police corruption in response to heightened public outcry for more efficient law enforcement.
IV
EROSION OF THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE
A.

EROSION OF THE INTENT REQUIREMENT

Although the public pressure for crime control has not visibly increased police corruption, it certainly has contributed to a slow erosion of
the substantive elements of a criminal offense under German law. Despite
the importance modem criminal theorists place on the state of mind or
mens rea of an offender,46 in practice the role of subjective components
such as intent is being downplayed. Where only a strong suspicion of
intent exists, German prosecutors are increasingly charging offenders with
crimes of negligence rather than risking acquittal of the accused for lack of
proof of intent.
This approach to prosecution seriously confuses evidentiary problems
with issues of substantive law. An important scholarly achievement of the
19th century was the sharp separation of the law of evidence from substantive law.47 The concept of negligence did not develop as a lesser state of
mind requirement for use when there was insufficient evidence to establish
intent. Rather, it evolved as an independent standard to determine
whether a defendant should be held more responsible for his acts than if the
acts had occurred by mere chance or accident. As crimes requiring proof
of intent are reduced to crimes of negligence because of evidentiary
problems, the important separation is lost.
Not all legal systems attach the same procedural consequences to the
the current political trend toward eliminating procedural technicalities that hamper law enforcement).
46. On the refinement of the mens rea doctrine, see the recent monographs by M. BUROSTALLER, DAs FAHRLASSIGKEIrSDELIKT IM STRAFRECHT (1974); P. FRiSCH, DAs FAHRLAsSIGKEITSDELIKT UND DAS VERHALTEN DES VERLETZTEN (1973); G. JAKOBS, STUDIEN ZUM
FAHRLASSIGEN ERFOLGSDELIKT (1972); A. KAuFmANN, DAS SCHULDPR1NZIP (1977). See
also Grassberger, Aqfbau, Schuldgehalt und Grenzen der Fahrldssitgeit, unter besonderer
Berickrichtung des Verkehrssirafrechts in Osterreich, 5 ZErrscHmF'r FOR RECHTsVERGLEICHJNG [ZFRV] 18 (1964); Cornil, Die Fahrlkdsgkeitimfranzdsisch-belgischenSrafrech,
5 ZFRV 30 (1964); Kauflnann, DasfahrldsslgeDelit,5 ZFRV 41 (1964); Jakobs, DasFahrlds.
sigkeitsdelikt, in DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHTLICHE LANDEsREFERATE ZUM IX. INTERNATIONALEN KONGRESS FOR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNO 6, 30-33 (1974). On the mistake of law
doctrine, see Arzt, Ignorance or Mistake of Law, 24 Am. J. CoMP. L. 646 (1976).
47. See generally E. DEUTSCH, FAIASISlGKErr UND ERFORDERLICHE SOROFALT 154
(1963); J. HALL, GENERAL PINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 129 (2d ed. 1960); Mueller, Eine
amerikanischeSellungnahme zum Entwurf elnes Srafgesetzbuches E 1960, 73 ZSTW 297, 314
(1961).
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fundamental substantive differences between the state of mind standards of
intent, recklessness, and negligence. In the United States, it appears that
negligence and recklessness are presumed to exist whenever intent exists.
Negligence is a lesser offense "included" in both recklessness and intent,
and recklessness is a lesser offense "included" in intent.a8 In Germany,
however, the High Federal Court of Appeals has ruled that negligence does
49
not automatically exist whenever intent exists but is something different.
Consequently, mere suspicion of intent should, at least in theory, not only
lead to an acquittal of a crime of intent but also to acquittal of the related
crime of negligence; neither intent nor negligence has been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, the court in the case before it rejected
this outcome and treated the case as if the defendant's negligence had been
proven beyond doubt. The court therefore let the conviction stand. 50
The erosion of the intent requirement has occurred even for crimes
that traditionally have mandated a showing of intent because they were not
susceptible to being reduced to crimes of negligence. Larceny and fraud
are good examples. American law reflects an erosion of the common law
doctrine that larceny is a crime requiring intent.5 1 Similarly, the tradiGerman definition of fraud requires an intent to inflict an economic
tional
loss.5 2 If, for instance, the defendant issues a bad check, someone suffers
an economic loss. But the defendant's denial of intent is very difficult to
overcome, and proof that the defendant was reckless or negligent in expecting the check to clear is not sufficient to convict.
For decades German courts reluctantly acquitted defendants who denied having an intent to inflict economic loss. But recently a theory has
been developed and employed frequently that effectively circumvents the
intent requirement. The theory calls for determination of the defendant's
intent not at the time the check bounces but at the time the defendant wrote
the check. Any possibility that the check might bounce creates a risk at the
time the check is written that an economic loss will occur-that the check
will not cover the value of services rendered or goods received. Unless the
defendant knew the check would be honored at the time he wrote it, then he
had to know the risk of loss at that moment. The modification of the definition of loss from a completed loss to the possibility of loss has had the
48. See, eg., People v. Stamfield, 36 N.Y.2d 467, 330 N.E.2d 72, 369 N.Y.S.2d 400

(1976)(court rejected the argument that criminal recklessness and criminal negligence are mutually exclusive).
49. Judgment of Apr. 17, 1962, 17 BGHSt 210.
50. Id. at 212-13. For a criticism of this decision, see . BAUMANN, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 168 (8th ed. 1977).
51. See, eg., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.00 (McKinney 1975)(misapplication of prop-

erty)(recklessness resulting in permanent loss infers intent to create risk of such a loss).
52. STGB § 263; see G. ARzr, VERMOGENSDELIKTE (KERNBEREICH), in STRAFRECHr
BESONDERER TEn. 147, 163-69 (1978).
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effect of making recklessness in connection with the completed loss sufficient to convict bad check writers.
Inroads on the traditional intent requirement such as the one detailed
above have made it possible for Parliament openly to consider amending
the intent doctrine. A newly enacted and novel section of the German Penal Code, for example, changes the definition of fraud on the government
to include false or incomplete statements to officials charged with the distribution of public subsidies-including statements recklessly made-if the
person making such statements thereby gains an advantage for himself or
another.53 A long and bitter debate preceded the enactment of this section.
But the recklessness standard ultimately won approval because a mere suspicion of intent to defraud, although it will not prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt, will often be sufficient to establish recklessness beyond a
reasonable doubt.54
B.

ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS

A downgrading of mens rea is also occurring in the area of enforcement of administrative regulations. In the United States, the strict liability
doctrine permits abolition of a mens rea element altogether.5 5 Furthermore, the use of criminal sanctions to enforce these often highly technical
regulations is widespread. One of innumerable examples is section 5 of the
New York Insurance Law, which makes any violation of the insurance laws
56
or regulations a misdemeanor, unless the violation constitutes a felony.
In Germany it is generally accepted that strict liability, even for violations of administrative regulations, is unconstitutional.5 7 In addition, the
use of criminal sanctions for violations of more or less technical regulations
53. Law of July 29, 1976, [1976] BGB1 I 2034 (codified at STGB § 264 (1), (III)).
54. See the discussion in 49 DJT at MI (1972), especially the exchange between Professors
Gruenwald and Tiedemann, 49 DJT at Ml 13-14. See also Hiinerfeld, Die Diskussions Beitriige der Strafrechtslehrertagwzg1972 in Kiel, 85 ZSTW 450 (1973). A similar controversy
occurred a few years ago in America. Compare Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of
EnforcingEonomicRegulations,30 U. CHI. L. Rav. 423 (1963) with Ball
CrainalSanctionsin
& Friedman, The Use of CriminalSanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A
Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REv. 197 (1965).

55. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978)("strict liability
offenses are not unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements").

One of the circumstances in which the strict liability standard is employed is

suspicion of guilt that cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. J. HALL, supra note 47,
at 247-55 (questioning the use of strict liability under such circumstances). Cf. United States
v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)(unclear whether the conviction was based on proven liability, on a

presumption of guilt that the accused could not overcome, or on strict liability). Mr. Justice
Stewart in dissent seems to have taken the latter view. He criticized the Court for upholding

the defendant's conviction without proof "that he engaged in wrongful conduct amounting at
least to common law negligence". Id. at 683 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. N.Y. INs. LAW § 5(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
57. Judgment of Oct. 25, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 323, 334-36.
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has long been considered inappropriate. Increasingly, however, such viola58
tions are subject to criminal sanctions. The German Data Protection Act
enacted in 1977 is a good example.
As long as the regulations that incorporate criminal sanctions are enforced per se, they are tolerable. But selective prosecution of violations of
these regulations on the basis of whether the violations caused "real harm"
is a perversion of the criminal law. Increasingly, tax laws, safety rules and
the like have pervaded our lives to the point where everyone violates them
at one time or another. Recent experience has demonstrated that even the
President of the United States is not immune from violation of the tax
laws.

59

Inherent in this net of regulations in which everyone is an offender is
the potential for abuse in making discretionary decisions to prosecute. 60
The use of the IRS against political enemies of the Nixon administration 61
is a good example: given a searching examination, violations of the tax laws
are sure to turn up. Aside from the danger of politically motivated prosecutions, there is also a danger of selective enforcement against only those
suspected of having committed "real" substantive crimes, when the real
crimes committed cannot be proved or are too costly to prove.6 2 Although
the penalty is less severe than for a real crime, the risk that the offender will
be acquitted practically disappears and the procedure is much simpler and
less time-consuming. This method of selective enforcement of administrative regulations produces results very similar to those of plea bargaining.
A further possible consequence of selective enforcement of a growing
number of regulations is an erosion of the stability of the political system.
Consider, for instance, an administration that is hostile to the concept of
private enterprise. This administration's ability to enact significant reform
would be hampered by the checks and balances imposed upon
legislation
it.63 But perhaps the administration would not find any need to enact legislation to further its ideology. It might well be able to make the desired
58. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG], Law of Jan. 27, 1977, [1978] BGB1 1201. See note

78 infra and accompanying text.
59. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1973, at I, col 5.
60. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
61. See H. HALDEMA1, THE ENDS OF POWER 169-70 (1977).
62. See Judgment of Apr. 17, 1959, BGH, 13 MONATSCHR1FT FOR DEUTSCHES Rcl-rr
[MDR] 675 (1959)(unclear case of negligent homicide but clear health code violations in causing a typhus epidemic).
63. For example, in Germany the lower house of Parliament is "checked" by the upper
house. Grmdgesetz [GG] art. 77. Both the U.S. and German constitutions require more

than a simple majority vote of the federal legislature for constitutional amendments, U.S.
CONST. art. V (three-fourths); GG art. 79 (Il)(two-thirds). In addition, both countries provide

for participation of state governments in the amendment procedure. U.S. CONST. art. V; GG
art. 79 (Mn).
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fundamental changes in society simply by selectively enforcing existing
laws. This scenario may perhaps be unrealistic in the United States, where
radical changes in basic policy rarely occur. But in many European countries such policy changes are not unthinkable. The potential for intensified
repression through discretionary law enforcement may be more troublesome from the European perspective than from the American one.
V
CHANGES IN SOCIETAL ATTITUDES TOWARD CRIME
CONTROL
A. SOCIALIZATION OF CRIME LOSSES
Although they are significant, the changes in substantive and procedural criminal law may not be as important as changes in the attitudes of society in response to rising crime. The United States is much further along
than Germany in the areas of socialization of crime losses and privatization
of crime prevention. The socialization of crime losses can be illustrated
with a simple example. A businessman who perceives the odds to be five to
one in favor of his never being robbed or burglarized in his lifetime will
probably not buy theft insurance. Insurance may not even be available
when the risks of being victimized by theft are so low. If the businessman
is robbed he will have to bear the loss himself. If the businessman's expectation of being robbed or burglarized rises to once a year,64 he will either
take out insurance or he will have to raise his prices to cover the expected
loss. Thus, the loss due to robbery when the probability of being robbed is
high is borne by an insurance company or by customers: it is socialized.
This socialization process occurs in many different and sometimes intricate ways. 65 Victim compensation statutes, for example, are another
method of socializing crime losses. The socialization process can itself become a source of crime. Socialization of crime losses certainly makes the
commission of criminal acts easier, at least in a psychological way. It is not
the salesman of the liquor store who suffers the loss, but the company that
runs the store or its insurance company or perhaps not even this insurance
64. According to victimization studies, the actual risk of robbery or burglary is not quite
that high. In the five largest cities of the United States in 1972, the average risk of commercial
burglary was 392.2 and the average risk of robbery was 104A per 1000 businesses. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE NATION'S
FIVE LARGEST CITIES 23-27 (1974). Another more recent victimization study shows that the
risk of burglary is 441.5 and the risk of robbery is 98.9 per 1000 businesses per year. LAw
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS IN EIGHT AMERICAN CITIES 23, 39, 55, 71, 87, 103, 119, 135 (1976). These

figures indicate an average risk of one robbery every ten years and one burglary every two or

three years.
65. See G. ARzr, supra note 4, at chs. 2-3.
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company but the customers and so on. The concept of inflicting economic
harm on a person, traditionally inherent in a robbery, evaporates. Of
course, the socialization of property losses does not extend to the threat of
bodily injury to the victim. But the victim's risk of injury may decrease as
a result of the refusal of the victim to defend his property since his loss will
be borne by others rather than himself.
B.

1.

PRIVATIZATION OF CRIME PREVENTION

Crime Prevention by Avoidance of Victimization

Societal attitudes are also changing with alarming rapidity with respect
to the privatization of crime prevention. 66 In the wake of persistent increases in crime, crime prevention is increasingly becoming focused on protecting the citizenry from being victimized by crimes. The reasons for this
development include lack of police success in apprehending criminals and
greater satisfaction in counseling victims than in dealing with criminals.
At present, however, the new science of victimology is in an incredibly
primitive state.67 In the United States, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice deplored the lack of data on
crime victims. 68 Nonetheless, the greater attention given to crime victims
is influencing legal policy and societal attitudes.
The protective measures that the police urge on potential crime victims
amount in large measure to one thing: isolation. 69 Citizens are instructed
66. A study of the growth of the U.S. private police industry, consisting of five reports, has
been made for the U.S. Department of Justice. See J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, PRIVATE
POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES (5 vol. 1972). The study states that "there are anywhere from
1 to 2 private security workers for every regular public policeman in this country....
[Eistimates of the total number of private officers (guards, investigators, etc.) vary between
350,000 and 800,000." J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, THE PRIVATE POLICE INDUSTRY: ITS
NATURE AND ExTrNT 4 (PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES Vol. 4, 1972). The study
speculates on the future trend of public police protection, concluding that "[tihe issue of what
level and type of police services are to be provided, at public expense, to which segments of the
population, is extremely complex and sensitive." Id. at 105. Another study predicts that,
"lacking effective public action," a dramatic growth of private police protection and a corresponding decrease in public policing will occur, especially in inner city areas at night NATIONAL CoMMIssIoN ON THE CAUSE AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,

To ESTABLISH

JUSTICE,

To ENSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 44-45 (1969).
67. For a discussion of the inadequacy of-current prevention programs and police slogans,
see Arzt, Kriminalittsbekidmpfungdurch vorbeugendeSicherng-4uswegoder Sackgasse, 30
KIimnALIsTm 433 (1976).
68. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 135-36.
69. Isolation is a high price to pay, perhaps too high, to avoid victimization. See note 70
infra. Even if isolation does reduce the risk of victimization by strangers, it certainly does little
to avoid victimization by an offender who was previously acquainted with or is a relative of the
victim. Evidence shows that crimes involving a prior relationship are not prosecuted as vigorously as those that do not. In New York City, the statistics are astounding: the conviction rate
in assault cases involving a prior relationship is 46% as compared to 71% in non-prior relationship cases. The conviction rate in robbery cases is 37% where there was a prior relationship;
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to wall themselves into fortresses that the forces of crime cannot penetrate.
By encouraging this isolation, and by instilling in people a fear and distrust
of strangers, society suffers greatly in terms of the quality of life.70 The
tradeoff between the creation of a security mentality and the quality of life
is well stated in a 1977 Newsweek story on crime on the farm. 7' The article
concludes: "The rate of crime will not recede until more farmers become as
But if they do, something will have
security-conscious as city dwellers.
72
gone out of their way of life."
Furthermore, crime control is rapidly becoming a battle of wits and
economic means between criminals and potential victims. As a result, private prevention efforts have the effect of merely redistributing crime, not
preventing it. Those who are able to afford the price of security and thus to
protect themselves are less likely to be victimized than those who cannot.
American victimization statistics document this effect; 73 they demonstrate
that the lower the income of a family, the higher is their rate of victimization.
2

Exercise of PolicePower by Private Citizens

Another facet of the privatization of crime prevention is the exercise of
police power by private citizens. In the United States ordinances that prescribe security standards with which businesses must comply are, as far as I
can tell, commonplace. 74 The exercise of police power by private citizens-for instance, the wholesale deputizing of airline personnel to carry
out searches-is also widespread. In contrast, German legal thinking has
been dominated by a sharp distinction between crime control, which comes
where no prior relationship existed, the conviction rate is 88%. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS 28,

68 (1977). These figures indicate that there is less sympathy for victims who have not taken
adequate "withdrawal" methods to protect themselves.
70. Consider, for example, the following German police slogan directed at preventing sexual abuse of children: "Kids simply must know that they should not trust strangers!" See
Arzt, supra note 67, at 433.
71. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1977, at 101.
72. Id.
73. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMI-

NAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNrrD STATES 1973, at 21 (1976). This report shows that the
victimization risk of robbery with injury in 1973 was 5 per 1000 population for those with
family incomes of less than $3000. For those with family incomes of between $15,000 and
$25,000, the risk dropped to 2. Id. at 73, Table 12. The risks of robbery without injury at
these two income levels were 7 and 3, respectively; for rape, 2 and 1;for burglary, I ll and 93.
Id. at 73, 76, Tables 12, 17. See also G. ARZT, supra note 4, at 41.
74. See J. KAKALUi & S. WILDHORN, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (PRIVATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES voL 1, 1972); LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BURGLARY PREVENTION PROGRAMS (1975); NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY

TO REDUCE CRIME 92-95 (1973).
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under the state's police power, and private emergency measures, which are
permissible but of course not required under the self-defense doctrine.
Attempts to move away from this distinction have met with varied success. In 1966, the government promulgated a regulation to force taxicabs
to install a window pane separating the rear passenger seat from the driver
in order to discourage robberies. 75 The public outcry was so strong that
the responsible minister was almost forced to resign. Taxi drivers attacked
the regulation by claiming a constitutional right to risk their lives as they
saw fit. Even though the Supreme Constitutional Court declined to void
the regulation, 76 the government prudently decided to repeal it. Only a
few years after the idea to force taxis to take precautionary measures
against robberies had been abandoned, a ranking member of the Federal
Department of Justice suggested the following solution to shoplifting: issue
regulations forcing department stores to take security measures-for instance, prescribe a ratio of square meters of sales space to the number of
store detectives. 77 In addition, in 1977 the German Data Protection Act
created a scheme under which a company engaged in electronic data
processing must employ a special data protection "ombudsman. 7 8s The
ombudsman is responsible for detecting violations of the Act committed by
the company and reporting such violations to the government.
This shifting of the burden of crime prevention from the government
to the private individual destroys society's sense that apprehension of suspects, fact-finding, guilt determination, and sentencing should be prerogatives of the judiciary. If the privatization of crime prevention becomes
prevalent, privatization of guilt determination and sentencing may well follow. It was no accident that in the days of the American frontier, when the
government could grant only limited protection against crime, the people-who had to assume the burden of prevention-were also inclined to
challenge the judiciary's monopoly of guilt determination and sentencing.7 9
Modem examples of direct citizen action against "criminals" can be
observed in cases of shoplifting, disorderly conduct, and especially traffic
offenses.8 0 Moreover, private armed bodyguards have recently appeared in
75. Law of Jan. 6, 1966, [1966] BGBlI 61.
76. Judgment of Dec. 21, 1966, 21 BVerfGE 72 (1966).
77. Schoreit, Der in Zusammenhang mit dem Alternativentwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches
vorgelegle Enwu.feines Gesetzes gegen Ladendiebstahl (AE-GLD) im Lichte derKriminalstatisile
1974 und moderner Opfe forschun& 31 JURISTENZErruNG [JZ] 49 (1976).
78. BDSG §§ 28, 29, 38.

79. For a more complete discussion of such topics as vigilantism and lynching, see L.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 253, 505 (1973). See also R. POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 64 (1930) (attributing such private law enforcement activity to "naive
political theories of popular sovereignty" that have substantial roots in American history).
80. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 4, 1974, at 40 ("More and More Vigilants-Legal and Illegal"); KLEiNES KRIMiNOLOGISCHES WORTERBUCH 385 (G. Kaiser, F.
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response to the terrorist threat. The government is concerned about this
trend and the BKA, the German equivalent of the FBI, has begun to question the wisdom of a private prevention policy.8 ' A possible legal response
to the growth of private police is a partial denial of the right of self defense.8 2 The broad German concept of self defense assumes a private individual faced with unexpected attack.8 3 This rationale does not, however,
extend to self defense in an organized form where such attacks are anticipated. If these challenges to the state's monopoly to control crime continue
or increase, they may become one of the most frightening consequences of
the growth of crime.
CONCLUSION
Rising crime rates in the United States and Germany have produced
many changes in their respective criminal laws and societal attitudes. Pressures on the criminal justice system caused by increasing crime can be relieved only by resorting increasingly to discretionary prosecution strategies
with their many disadvantages.
Many other changes are occurring or may soon occur as a consequence
of increasing crime. Police power to combat crime may increase significantly and thereby infringe upon the rights of those accused of crimes. The
state of mind element of the commission of a crime is slowly eroding. Finally, high crime rates are causing the socialization of crime losses and the
privatization of crime prevention. Each of these adaptations to the higher
incidence of crime is generally more fully developed in the United States
than in Germany, but Germany is now beginning to experience them. By
placing these two countries in a comparative perspective, this Article may
contribute to a heightened awareness of the gradual changes now occurring
in response to the growth of crime and to the development of more carefully reasoned responses to the increasing crime rate.
Sack, H. Schellhoss eds. 1974)(emphasizing the relationship between private vigilante crime
control and the failure of official crime control); H. SCHNEIDER, VIKTIMOLOoIE 228 (1975)

(social conformists as victims because of lack of rule enforcement). For recent examples of
German vigilante activities see Judgment of Apr. 15, 1975, 64 BGHZ 178,28 NJW 1161 (1975)
(court rejected with difficulty defendants' argument that they acted in defense of their right of
privacy in smashing a bookstore window where obscene books were on display); Die Zeit,

Sept. 16, 1977, at 4 (editorial by Bucerius on the kidnapping of the industrialist Schleyer by
terrorists, regretting that department stores are not permitted to display publicly the names of
those caught shoplifting).

See also Arzt, Notwehr, Selbsthife, Birgerwehr, in FESTSCHRIFr

FOR FRIEDRICH ScHAFFsTEiN 77, 87-88 (1975) (examples of vigilantism in cases of traffic offenses and loitering).
81. At last a critical discussion of the issue "police and prevention" is underway. See
BUNDESKRIMINALAMT WIESBADEN, POLIZEI UND PRAVENTON (1976) (summaries in English).
82. Such a restriction has been proposed. Hoffmann-Riem, (ibergang der Polzeigewalt
aufPrivateZ 10 ZRP 277, 282-84 (1977).
83. See generally Fletcher, Proportionalityandthe PsychoticAggressorA i'gneltein ComparativeCriminalTheory 8 IsRAEL L. REv. 367 (1973); Arzt, Book Review, 24 Am. J. COMP. L.
554 (1976).
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